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In an e⁄ort to make public organizations more e¢ cient, governments around the world make use
of ￿ hard￿performance targets. Examples include student test scores for the schooling sectors in
the US, England and Chile (see the survey by Figlio and Loeb, 2011) and patient waiting times
in the English public health care system (Propper et al, 2010). Accountability based on hard or
objective performance measures has the bene￿t of being transparent but a potential drawback is
that such schemes may lead to gaming behavior in a setting where incentives focus on just one
dimension of a multifaceted outcome.1
Subjective evaluation, on the other hand, holds out the promise of ￿ measuring what matters￿ .
However, a system where the evaluator is allowed to exercise his or her own judgement, rather than
following a formal decision rule, raises a new set of concerns. Results from the theoretical literature
emphasize in￿ uence activities and favoritism (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; Prendergast and Topel,
1996) which make the subjective measure ￿ corruptible￿(Dixit, 2002). Empirical evidence on the
e⁄ectiveness of subjective evaluation remains thin.2
This paper empirically evaluates a subjective performance evaluation regime for schools. The
setting is the English public (state) schooling system, where independent inspectors visit schools
with a maximum of two days notice, assess the school￿ s performance and disclose their ￿ndings on
the internet. Inspectors combine hard metrics, such as test scores, with softer ones, such as obser-
vations of classroom teaching, in order to arrive at a judgement of school quality. Furthermore,
schools rated ￿ fail￿may be subject to sanctions, such as more frequent and intensive inspections.
Inspection systems exist in many countries around the world and in-class evaluations by exter-
nal assessors have been proposed recently in the US for the K-12 sector as well as the pre-school
Head Start program.3 Yet, very little hard empirical evidence exists on the e⁄ects of inspection
systems (see, for example, the review by Faubert, 2009). An evaluation of the English inspection
regime, which is well-embedded and has been in place since the early 1990s, may provide valuable
lessons for other countries.
I provide evidence on the e⁄ectiveness of inspections along the following dimensions. First,
do inspector ratings provide any extra information on school quality, over and above that already
available in the public sphere? Second, I examine the e⁄ects of a fail inspection on student test
1See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) for a formal statement of the multitasking model. Dixit (2002) discusses
incentive issues in the public sector. For empirical examples of dysfunctional behaviour in the education sector see
the references below.
2As noted by Prendergast (1999, p.33), the economics literature has largely focused on "workers with easily
observed output [who are] a small fraction of the population." See also the survey by Lazear and Oyer (forthcoming).
In many settings good objective measures may not be immediately available. For example, in their analysis of active
labor market programs, Heckman et al (2011, p.10) note that: ￿..the short-term measures that continue to be used
in...performance standards systems are only weakly related to the true long-run impacts of the program.￿Whether
complementing objective performance evaluation with subjective assessment is an e⁄ective strategy in such settings
remains an open question.
3Haskins and Barnett (￿Finally, the Obama Administration Is Putting Head Start to the Test￿ , The Washington
Post, October 11, 2010) note that the US administration has proposed a review of all Head Start centers, a central
component of which may be in-class evaluation of the quality of teacher support and instruction by external
assessors.
2scores. If a school fails its inspection, the stakes - certainly for the school principal - are high.4
Consequently the incentives to generate improvements in school performance are strong. Thus it
seems plausible that the fail treatment will a⁄ect both the mean and the distribution of student
test scores.
However, empirically identifying the e⁄ect of a fail rating on test scores is plagued by the
kind of mean reversion problems encountered in evaluations of active labour market programs
(Ashenfelter, 1978). As explained below, assignment to treatment, fail, is at least partly based on
past realizations of the outcome variable, test scores. Any credible strategy must overcome the
concern that poor performance prior to a fail inspection is simply due to bad luck and that test
scores would have risen even in the absence of the inspection. Figure 1 illustrates the problem in
the current setting.
Third, I investigate whether any estimated positive e⁄ect of a fail inspection on test scores
can be explained by strategic or dysfunctional responses by teachers. A growing literature has
established the empirical importance of such phenomena in the context of schools.5 I test to what
extent such behavior can be detected in the current context.
The ￿ndings of this study are as follows. In order to address whether inspection ratings pro-
vide any additional information on school quality, I ask whether these ratings are correlated with
teenage student survey reports of teacher practices, conditional on standard observable school
characteristics.6 The results from this ￿ validity test￿demonstrate that ratings are strongly associ-
ated with these survey measures of school quality. For example, the association between inspection
ratings and student survey reports of teacher practices is economically meaningful and statisti-
cally signi￿cant, even after conditioning on the school￿ s test rank, proportion of students eligible
for a free lunch and other school and student characteristics. This implies that students enrolled
in schools with better inspection ratings experience an environment where, according to student
self-reports, teachers practices are superior. Similar ￿ndings hold for survey measures of parent
satisfaction.
Turning to the e⁄ect of a fail rating on test scores, I exploit a design feature of the English
testing system to assess the causal e⁄ect of a fail inspection. As explained below, tests for age-11
students in England are administered in the second week of May in each year.7 These tests are
marked externally, and results are released to schools and parents in mid-July. The short window
4Hussain (2009) analyzes the e⁄ects of inspections on the teacher labor market. The evidence shows that when
schools receive a ￿ severe fail￿inspection rating, there is a signi￿cant rise in the probability that the school principal
exits the teaching labour market. The next section provides further details.
5The overall message from this body of evidence is that when a school￿ s incentives are closely tied to test scores
teachers will often adopt strategies which arti￿cially boost the school￿ s measured test score performance. Strategies
include excluding low ability students from the test taking pool and targeting students on the margin of passing
pro￿ciency thresholds, see, for example, Figlio 2006, Jacob 2005 and Neal and Schanzenbach 2010.
6One way to motivate this test is to ask whether parents engaged in searching for a school for their child should
place any weight on inspection ratings. If the inspection ratings pass the validity test, then prospective parents
may have some con￿dence that the ratings help forecast the views of the school￿ s current stock of students and
parents, even after conditioning on publicly available school indicators.
7O¢ cial tests are administered twice to students in the primary schooling phase, at ages seven and 11.
3between May and July allows me to address the issue of mean reversion: schools failed in June
are failed after the test in May but before the inspectors know the outcome of the tests.8 By
comparing schools failed early in the academic year - September, say - with schools failed in June,
I can isolate mean reversion from the e⁄ect of the fail inspection.9
Results using student-level data from a panel of schools show that students at early failed
schools (the treatment group) gain around 0.1 of a standard deviation on age-11 national stan-
dardized mathematics and English tests relative to students enrolled in late fail schools (the control
group).
This overall ￿nding masks substantial heterogeneity in treatment e⁄ects. In particular, the
largest gains are for students scoring low on the prior (age seven) test; these gains cannot be
explained by ceiling e⁄ects for the higher ability students.10 For mathematics, students in the
bottom quartile of the age-seven test score distribution gain 0.2 of a standard deviation on the
age-eleven test, whilst for students in the top quartile the gain is 0.05 of a standard deviation.
The empirical strategy allows for tests of gaming behavior on a number of key margins. The
results show that teachers do not exclude low ability students from the test-taking pool. Next, the
evidence tends to reject the hypothesis that teachers target students on the margin of attaining
the o¢ cial pro￿ciency level at the expense of students far above or below this threshold. Finally,
there is evidence to suggest that for some students, gains last into the medium term, even after
they have left the fail school. These ￿ndings are consistent with the notion that teachers inculcate
real learning and not just test-taking skills in response to the fail rating.
Having ruled out important types of gaming behavior, I provide tentative evidence on what
might be driving the main results. First, I di⁄erentiate between the two sub-categories of the
fail rating - termed ￿ moderate￿and ￿ severe￿fail. As explained below, the former category involves
increased oversight by the inspectors but does not entail other dramatic changes in inputs or
school principal and teacher turnover. The results show that even for this category of moderate
fail schools there are substantial gains in test scores following a fail inspection. Second, employing
a survey of teachers, I provide evidence that a fail inspection does not lead to higher turnover (at
the classroom teacher level), relative to a set of control schools. However, teachers at fail schools do
appear to respond by improving classroom discipline. Piecing this evidence together suggests that
greater e⁄ort by the current stock of classroom teachers at fail schools is an important mechanism
behind the test score gains reported above.
The main contribution of this study is to o⁄er new evidence on the e⁄ectiveness of subjective
performance evaluation in the public sector. It sheds light on the usefulness of top-down moni-
8So that the May test outcome for these schools is not a⁄ected by the subsequent fail, but neither do inspectors
select them for failure on the basis of this outcome.
9The descriptive analysis demonstrates that there is little di⁄erence in observable characteristics between schools
failed in June (the control group) and schools failed in the early part of the academic year (the treatment group).
This, combined with the fact that timing is determined by a mechanical rule, suggests that there are unlikely to
be unobservable di⁄erences between control and treatment schools. The claim then is that when comparing early
and late fail schools within a year, treatment (early inspection) is as good as randomly assigned.
10Quantile regression analysis reveals substantial gains across all quantiles of the test score distribution.
4toring for schools by external assessors who exercise discretion in forming their judgements. In
particular, the evidence suggests that inspectors can identify schools which improve under pressure
of a fail rating. The ￿nding that such intervention by bureaucrats, or so-called ￿ experts￿ , is espe-
cially helpful in improving outcomes for students from poorer households conforms with emerging
evidence suggesting that such families may face especially severe information constraints.11
This study also contributes to a small but growing literature investigating the validity of
novel measures of school and teacher e⁄ectiveness. These include school principals￿subjective
assessment of teacher e⁄ectiveness (Jacob and Lefgren, 2008) as well as in-class evaluations of
teacher performance by mentors and peers external to the school (Rocko⁄ and Speroni, 2010,
Kane et al, 2010, and Taylor and Tyler, 2011). As far as I am aware, this is the ￿rst study
investigating the validity of inspector ratings.
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the context for this study
and the relevant theoretical background. Section 3 reports ￿ndings on the validity of inspection
ratings. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy adopted to evaluate the e⁄ect of a fail inspection
on student test scores. This section also describes the empirical methods employed to test for




The English public schooling system combines centralized testing with school inspections. Tests
take place at ages 7, 11, 14 and 16; these are known as the Key Stage 1 to Key Stage 4 tests,
respectively12. Successive governments have used these Key Stage tests, especially Key Stages 2
and 4, as pivotal measures of performance in holding schools to account. For further details see,
for example, Machin and Vignoles (2005).
Since the early 1990s all English public schools have been inspected by a government agency
called the O¢ ce for Standards in Education, or Ofsted. As noted by Johnson (2004), Ofsted
has three primary functions: (i) o⁄er feedback to the school principal and teachers; (ii) provide
information to parents to aid their decision-making process; and (iii) identify schools which su⁄er
from ￿ serious weakness￿ .13 Although Ofsted employs its own in-house team of inspectors, the body
contracts out the majority of inspections to a handful of private sector and not-for-pro￿t organiza-
11Hastings and Weinstein (2008) provide evidence on the importance of information constraints for poor house-
holds when choosing among schools.
12Note that the age-14 (Key Stage 3) tests were abolished in 2008.
13In its own words, the inspectorate reports the following as the primary purpose of a school inspection: ￿The
inspection of a school provides an independent external evaluation of its e⁄ectiveness and a diagnosis of what it
should do to improve, based upon a range of evidence including that from ￿rst-hand observation. Ofsted￿ s school
inspection reports present a written commentary on the outcomes achieved and the quality of a school￿ s provision
(especially the quality of teaching and its impact on learning), the e⁄ectiveness of leadership and management and
the school￿ s capacity to improve.￿(Ofsted, 2011, p.4).
5tions via a competitive tendering process.14 Setting overall strategic goals and objectives, putting
in place an inspection framework which guides the process of inspection, as well as responsibility
for the quality of inspections, remain with Ofsted.
Over the period relevant to this study, schools were generally inspected once during an in-
spection cycle.15 An inspection involves an assessment of a school￿ s performance on academic and
other measured outcomes, followed by an on-site visit to the school, typically lasting between one
and two days for primary schools.16 Inspectors arrive at the school at very short notice (maxi-
mum of two to three days), which should limit disruptive ￿ window dressing￿in preparation for the
inspections.17 Importantly for the empirical strategy employed in the current study, inspections
take place throughout the academic year, September to July.
During the on-site visit, inspectors collect qualitative evidence on performance and practices
at the school. A key element of this is classroom observation. As noted in Ofsted (2011b): ￿The
most important source of evidence is the classroom observation of teaching and the impact it is
having on learning. Observations provide direct evidence for [inspector] judgements.￿(p. 18). In
addition, inspectors hold in-depth interviews with the school leadership, examine students￿work
and have discussions with pupils and parents. The evidence gathered by the inspectors during
their visit as well as the test performance data form the evidence base for each school￿ s inspection
report. The school is given an explicit headline grade, ranging between 1 (￿ Outstanding￿ ) and
4 (￿ Unsatisfactory￿ ; also known as a fail rating). The report is made available to students and
parents and is posted on the internet.18
There are two categories of fail, a moderate fail (known as ￿ Notice to Improve￿ ) and a more
severe fail category (￿ Special Measures￿ ). Sanctions for these two treatments vary as follows. For
the moderate fail category, schools are subject to additional inspections, with an implicit threat of
downgrade to the severe fail category if inspectors judge improvements to be inadequate. Schools
receiving the severe fail rating, however, may experience more dramatic intervention: these can
include changes in the school leadership team and the school￿ s governing board, increased resources,
as well as increased oversight from the inspectors.19
Over the relevant period for this study (September 2006 to July 2009) 13 percent of schools
received the best rating, ￿ Outstanding￿(grade 1); 48 percent received a ￿ Good￿(grade 2) rating; 33
14As of 2011, Ofsted tendered school inspections to three organizations, two are private sector ￿rms, the third is
not-for-pro￿t.
15Inspection cycles typically lasted between three and six years. From September 2009 schools judged to be good
or better are subject to fewer inspections than those judges to be mediocre or worse (Ofsted, 2011a).
16English primary schools cater for students between the age of 5 and 11.
17This short notice period has been in place since September 2005. Prior to this, schools had many weeks,
sometimes many months, of notice of the exact date of the inspection. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these
long notice periods resulted in disruptive preparations for the inspections. There is some evidence to suggest that
inspections may have had a small adverse e⁄ect on test scores in the year of inspection during this long-notice
inspection regime (see Rosenthal 2004); see also Matthews and Sammons (2004). Allen and Burgess (2012) provide
suggestive evidence that students gain from a fail inspection.
18These can be obtained from http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/.
19For evidence of the negligible e⁄ects of a moderate fail on principal turnover and the contrasting large e⁄ects
for severe fail schools, see Hussain (2009).
6percent received a ￿ Satisfactory￿(grade 3) rating; and 6 percent received a ￿ Fail￿(grade 4) rating.
The Fail rating can be decomposed into 4.5 percent of schools receiving the moderate fail and 1.5
percent of schools receiving the severe fail rating.
Inspectors clearly place substantial weight on test scores: this is borne out by analysis of
the data as well as o¢ cial policy statements.20 Regression analysis (not reported here in full for
brevity) demonstrates a strong association between the likelihood of being failed and test scores.
Conditional on the proportion of students eligible for free lunch and local authority ￿xed e⁄ects, a
decline of ten national percentile points on a school￿ s test performance in the year before inspection
is associated with a 3 percentage point rise in the probability of being rated fail. Nevertheless,
as the above discussion indicates, test scores are not the only signal used by inspectors to rate
schools. This is demonstrated by the fact that around 25 percent of schools in the bottom quarter
of the test score distribution were rated either Outstanding or Good during the 2006 to 2009
period.
2.2 Theoretical Background
In order to arrive at the overall school rating, inspectors must combine two signals of underlying
school quality - the objective measure (the school￿ s test rank) and the subjective assessment from
the school visit. Suppose the principal (a policymaker acting on behalf of parents, say) can instruct
the inspector how these two measures should be combined. Then the key question is what are the
optimal weights to attach to each of these two measures.
Some guidance on this issue is provided by the personnel economics literature investigating
optimal contract design for ￿rms where workers are subjectively assessed by supervisors. These
studies emphasize the potential for biased supervisor reports arising from, for example, in￿ uence
activities (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988) and favoritism (Prendergast and Topel, 1996). Two key
implications of this literature are as follows. First, supervisors may compress worker performance
ratings. Compressed ratings can arise through leniency bias, where supervisors are reluctant to
give bad ratings to underperforming workers, as well as centrality bias, where all or most workers
are rated adequate or good according to prevailing social norms. Second, this literature notes that
the principal will make use of bureaucratic rules, such as using seniority in determining promotions
and job assignment (Prendergast, 1999). Consequently, incentives may be muted and talent may
not be optimally allocated, but on the upside, such bureaucracy will limit rent seeking behavior
and unproductive activities, such as time spent ingratiating with the supervisor.
In the current setting, where there is limited scope for long-term relations and repeated inter-
action between the assessor (inspector) and the worker (school principal and teachers), arguably
mechanisms such as in￿ uence activities and favoritism are less important. Thus, ratings compres-
20The government views test scores as an ￿ anchor￿ in the English accountability system. See,
for example, the statement by the secretary of state for education in oral evidence to the House
of Commons education select committee (Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence, 31 January 2012,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeduc/uc1786-i/uc178601.htm, accessed Febru-
ary 10, 2012.)
7sion may not be as important an issue as it is in the private ￿rm context. This is borne out by
the spread of inspector ratings observed in the data (see discussion in the previous section).
However, a number of potential concerns remain with subjective evaluation even in this one-
shot setting. First, there is the possibility that the inspector is misled into thinking the school is
of higher quality than it really is if, as seems likely, teachers respond to the inspection visit by
delivering lessons of a higher quality than is the norm.21
Perhaps even more importantly, it can be argued that relative to teachers and parents, inspec-
tors have limited knowledge of both the student￿ s education production function as well as the
best use of inputs to maximize social welfare. But the incentives for teachers under an inspection
regime may be distorted such that they seek to satisfy inspectors rather than serve the interests
of students or their parents. Relatedly, if the inspection body takes a particular stance on peda-
gogical practice, there is also the danger that such a top-down approach to accountability drives
out variety and experimentation in the production of education, leading to a loss of e¢ ciency.
This logic suggests that, just as in the case of ￿rms, the policymaker may want to limit
the weight placed on the subjective component of the inspection process. As before, assessor
bias is a concern. But in the case of school inspections, the discussion above suggests that an
additional concern is that inspectors impose a ￿ cooky cutter￿or ￿ one size ￿ts all￿approach when
assessing school quality. Overall, these two mechanisms will tend to reinforce the reliance on test
scores.22 The trade-o⁄is the potential for increased gaming behavior associated with the objective
performance measure.
The empirical analysis in the next section assesses whether inspector ratings are valid, i.e.
related to underlying school quality measures not observed by the inspectors. This relates to the
issues of inspector bias discussed above. In particular, the question addressed is whether ratings
add any value in terms of providing additional information on school quality over and above that
already available in the public sphere, such as test scores.
Teachers￿Behavioral Response to a Fail Rating
As noted above, there are clear sanctions for schools inspectors judge to be failing. Teachers
may respond directly to such incentives by increasing the supply of e⁄ort. These incentives may
also be mediated through the school principal, who arguably faces the strongest sanctions.23
21Inspectors may of course apply some discount factor when evaluating quality of observed lessons. Nevertheless,
there is evidence to suggest that the performance measurement technology is indeed imperfect. When inspections
moved from many weeks notice to a few days notice in 2005, there was a dramatic rise in the proportion of schools
failing the inspection. One explanation for this rise is that under the longer notice period teachers were able to put
in place processes which arti￿cially boost measured quality in time for the inspection visit. The possibility remains
that such strategies are employed even under very short notice inspections.
22One policy rule might be for inspectors to concentrate their e⁄orts on schools falling below a given threshold
on the objective performance measure. As discussed in the previous section, such an approach may be in line with
the one adopted by the English inspectorate starting in September 2009.
23In a private sector setting, Bandiera et al (2007) show that when managers are incentivized on the average
productivity of lower tier workers they target their e⁄ort to particular workers and select out the least able workers,
raising overall productivity.
8However, strong incentives to perform on a particular metric (test scores) may also lead teachers
to try to game the system. Such gaming behavior may have distributional consequences and may
also lead to misallocation of resources. Courty and Marschke (2011, p. 205) provide the following
de￿nition: ￿A dysfunctional response is an action that increases the performance measure but
is unsupported by the designer because it does not e¢ ciently further the true objective of the
organization.￿ The authors go on to propose a formal classi￿cation of dysfunctional responses
based on the multitasking model (Baker, 1992; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
In the schooling setting there are a number of dimensions along which such strategic response
has been documented. First, studies show that under test-based accountability systems teachers
may remove low ability students from the testing pool, for example by suspending them over testing
periods or reclassifying them as special needs (Jacob 2005, Figlio 2006). Second, teachers may
￿ teach to the test,￿so that the performance measure (the high stakes test) rises whilst other aspects
of learning may be neglected (Koretz 2002). Third, when schools are judged on the number of
students attaining a given pro￿ciency level it has been shown that teachers target students close to
the pro￿ciency threshold (Neal and Schanzenbach 2010). Fourth, there may be outright cheating
by teachers (Jacob and Levitt 2003). In the empirical analysis below, I outline the approach I
adopt to detect these types of responses.
Aside from these strategic concerns, at a theoretical level there is another reason to expect
heterogeneity in student test score gains in response to the fail treatment. This arises from the
hypothesis that parents may have di⁄erential ability to monitor their child￿ s teacher and the
progress the child makes in school. If teachers are able to slack when monitoring by parents is less
e⁄ective then it is possible that students even in the same classroom receive di⁄erential levels of
attention and e⁄ort from the teacher. If teachers raise e⁄ort levels in response to a fail inspection,
they may do so where the marginal gain is greatest. Arguably, this may be with respect to
students who received the least attention prior to the inspection. In the empirical analysis below,
I investigate whether the evidence supports the hypothesis that gains from a fail inspection fall
disproportionately in favor of students whose parents may be the least e⁄ective in monitoring the
quality of education provided by the school.
3 Evidence on the Validity of Inspection Ratings
This section investigates whether inspection ratings convey any information on school quality
beyond that which is already captured by, for example, test score rankings. The critical question
is whether inspectors visiting the school are able to gather and summarize information about
underlying school quality which is not already available in the public sphere.24 This speaks to
the issues of inspector bias discussed in section 2.2. Furthermore, if inspectors rely mostly or
24Prior evidence suggests that inspectors￿￿ndings are reliable: Matthews et al (1998) show that two inspectors
independently observing the same lesson come to very similar judgements regarding the quality of classroom
teaching. The question addressed here is whether inspection ratings are also valid in the sense of being correlated
with underlying measures of school quality not observed by the inspectors.
9exclusively on test scores to arrive at the overall rating then, conditional on test scores, these
ratings will have limited power to forecast measures of underlying school quality not observed by
the inspectors.
This test may be compared to that proposed by Jacob and Lefgren (2005). They ￿nd that
the school principal￿ s subjective assessment of teacher e⁄ectiveness can help forecast a measure of
parental satisfaction (parent requests for a teacher). In addition, in on-going work, researchers have
found that student perceptions of a teacher￿ s strengths and weaknesses are related to achievement
gains (including in other classes taught by the same teacher).25
The data employed to construct the two measures of underlying school quality (student per-
ceptions and parent satisfaction) come from the Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England
(LSYPE). This is a major survey supported by the Department for Education. The survey includes
the following six questions asked of students aged 14 on how likely teachers are to: take action
when a student breaks rules; make students work to their full capacity; keep order in class; set
homework; check that any homework that is set is done; and mark students￿work. Five questions
asked of parents relate to satisfaction with the following aspects: interest shown by teachers in
the child, school discipline, child￿ s school progress, and feedback from teachers.
A composite student-level score is computed by taking the mean of the responses to the six
questions relating to student perceptions. These student-level means are then converted into
z-scores by normalizing them to mean zero and standard deviation one.26 The validity test is
implemented by regressing the composite z-scores, q, on inspection ratings as well as other school
and respondent family background characteristics:
qijk = Xij￿ + b:Ratingj + ￿k + uijk; (1)
where i indicates individual survey respondent (the unit of observation) at school j in local au-
thority k. Xij captures school- and student-level variables and ￿k represents local authority ￿xed
e⁄ects. School-level variables include the school￿ s national percentile test rank, the proportion of
students eligible for a free lunch and whether the school is secular or religious. Detailed student
background controls include prior test score, ethnic background, parents￿education, income, eco-
nomic activity and whether in receipt of government bene￿ts. ￿ Ratingj￿is the school￿ s inspection
rating.27 Similar regressions are run for the parent-level satisfaction z-score outcome, computed
25Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (December 2010), Learning About Teaching: Ini-
tial Findings from the Measures of E⁄ective Teaching Project, report, available at:
http://www.metproject.org/downloads/Preliminary_Findings-Research_Paper.pdf (accessed 15 December
2011).
26A higher z-score corresponds to higher quality as reported by the student.
27On the timing of the survey and the inspections, note that students were asked questions relating to teacher
practices in the academic year 2003/04. I extract from the data those LSYPE respondents who attend a school
inspected soon after the survey, i.e. between 2004/05 and 2006/07. Thus, ￿ Ratingj￿corresponds to the rating from
one of these three years. (Over this period schools were inspected once every ￿ve or six years.) Most schools will
also have been inspected prior to 2003/04. To guard against the possibility that the previous inspection rating may
in￿ uence student survey responses, some of the regression results reported below also control for past inspection
ratings. Students in schools inspected in 2003/04, the year of the survey, are excluded, because it is di¢ cult to
10using the ￿ve parent satisfaction questions.
The inspection ratings are then said to be valid if the coe¢ cient on the inspection rating
variable, b, remains statistically signi￿cant and economically meaningful in the ￿ long￿regression
(1). Note that this parameter simply captures the conditional association between the inspection
rating and the measure of quality, q; it does not estimate a causal e⁄ect. Another way to view this
validity test is as follows. ￿ Insider￿views of the school (from students and their parents) potentially
provide useful information to other decision makers. Such feedback information from consumers
is typically not observed in the public sector.28 Inspection ratings may play an important role in
helping to ￿ll this gap if they can be used to forecast consumers￿views of quality.29
Results
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the unconditional relationship between the teacher practices z-
score and the inspection rating. The results suggest that each unit decline in performance on the
inspection rating is associated with 0.22 of a standard deviation decline in the teacher practices
z-score.30 Thus, the gap in the z-scores between an Outstanding (Grade 1) and a Fail (Grade 4)
school is around 0.7 of a standard deviation.
Controlling for the school￿ s test percentile and the proportion of students receiving a free school
meal in column 2 leads to a 40% reduction in the association between the inspection rating and
the teacher practices z-score. Given that inspection ratings and test scores are correlated, this
is not surprising. The noteworthy ￿nding is that the coe¢ cient on the inspection rating remains
large, in relative terms, and is highly signi￿cant. (Also included as controls in column 2 are the
size and type of school as well as local education authority ￿xed e⁄ects.)
Column 3 includes detailed controls on students￿family background and prior test scores.31
These lead to a minor fall in the absolute size of the coe¢ cient on inspection ratings, which
remains statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. Column 4 includes the inspection rating
prior to the year of the student interview, 2003/04. This addresses the concern that students￿
survey responses may be in￿ uenced by past inspection ratings. If a school￿ s inspection ratings
are correlated over time then the results in Table 1 may simply be capturing the e⁄ect of past
pinpoint whether the survey took place before or after the inspection. This yields a sample of just over 10,000
students enrolled in 435 secondary schools.
28Heckman (2000) notes that for public schools in the US: "One valuable source of information - parental and
student perception of the qualities of teachers and schools - is rarely used to punish poor teaching" (p. 24).
29For example, if inspection ratings can be used to predict student perceptions of the quality of teaching, then
for parents currently engaged in choosing schools, it may be optimal to place some weight on these ratings when
making their decisions.
30Note that although the R-squared value of 0.035 for the regression in column (1) is small, this should not come
as a surprise given the noisy nature of the left hand side variable. Recall that this is derived from a survey of
around 20 students from each school, representing just 2 or 3 per cent of the total student body.
31There may be a concern that students from di⁄erent socioeconomic backgrounds respond to the survey questions
in systematically di⁄erent ways, even if underlying teacher practices are the same. For example, students from
poorer backgrounds or those scoring low marks on prior tests may have more negative or positive opinions about
teachers than richer or better performing students. There is then the possibility that the relationship between
inspection ratings and the survey z-scores is an artefact of this sort of bias in response to the survey questions.
Including detailed student background controls should address some of these concerns.
11inspections on respondents￿views. The results in column 4 show that the e⁄ect of including
dummies for the most recent inspection rating before the interview has only a small e⁄ect on the
estimated e⁄ect.
The results in column 4 with the full set of controls suggest that worse inspection ratings
are associated with sharply declining school quality as measured by student reports of teacher
practices. The strength of this gradient may be gauged by comparing the decline in quality
associated with declines in the school￿ s position in the national test score distribution: the results
show that a fall of 50 percentile points is associated with a fall of 0.15 (0.0029 x 50) of one standard
deviation in the teacher practices z-score. Compare this with a two-unit deterioration - e.g. from
Outstanding to Satisfactory - in the inspection rating: this is associated with a decline of 0.21 of
one standard deviation in the teacher practices z-score.
Results for the parent satisfaction outcome are very similar to those reported for the teacher
practices outcome. For brevity, column 5 in Table 1 shows the results for the parent satisfaction
outcome with the full set of controls. These results demonstrate that the association between
inspection ratings and parental satisfaction is also strong. A two-unit deterioration in the inspec-
tion rating is associated with a decline of 0.17 of one standard deviation in the parent satisfaction
z-score.32
In summary, this analysis reveals that inspection ratings can help detect good and poor teacher
practices (or high and low parental satisfaction) among schools with the same test rankings and
socioeconomic composition of students. The results paint a highly consistent picture across all
the student and parent measures: the inspection ratings do indeed convey information about
school quality over and above that already contained in publicly available information. Moreover,
separate regression results (not reproduced here) for each of the items which make up the composite
scores also point to the same conclusion. For example, each of the six items which make up the
teacher practices composite score show that the relationship with inspection ratings is negative and
statistically signi￿cant. I.e., a better inspection rating is associated with better teacher practices
on each of the six underlying measures. This implies that conditional on local authority ￿xed
e⁄ects as well as observable school and detailed student characteristics, students at higher rated
schools experience an environment where teachers are more likely to: take action when a student
breaks rules; make students work to their full capacity; keep order in class; set homework; check
that any homework that is set is done; and mark students￿work.
32Further analysis, not reported here, allows for non-linear e⁄ects. For the teacher practices outcome, there is
some evidence suggesting a mildly concave relationship between teacher practices and inspection ratings: the gap
is largest when we move from a Grade 1 school to Grade 2; it is smallest between Grade 3 and Grade 4 (Fail)
schools. For the parental satisfaction outcome, the linearity assumption appears to be justi￿ed.
124 The E⁄ect of a Fail Inspection on Test Scores: Empirical
Strategy
The primary question addressed here is: What is the e⁄ect of a fail inspection on students￿
subsequent test scores? As described earlier, selection into the fail treatment is based at least
partly on past test performance. Therefore, a simple school ￿xed-e⁄ect analysis using pre- and
post-fail test score data for a panel of schools quite possibly confounds any e⁄ect of a fail rating
with mean reverting behavior of test scores. For example, if inspectors are not fully able to account
for idiosyncratic negative shocks unrelated to actual school quality, then arguably any test score
rise following a fail inspection would have occurred even in the absence of treatment.
This study exploits a design feature of the English testing system to address such concerns.
The age-11 ￿ Key Stage 2￿tests ￿administered at the national level and a central plank in student
and school assessment ￿take place over ￿ve days in the second week of May each year. The results
of these tests are then released in mid-July. The short window between May and July allows me
to address the issue of mean reversion: schools failed in June are failed after the test in May but
before the inspectors know the outcome of the tests. Thus the May test outcome for these schools
is not a⁄ected by the subsequent fail, but neither do inspectors select them for failure on the basis
of this outcome. See Figure 2 for an example time line for the year 2005/06.
This insight enables me to identify credible causal estimates of the short-term e⁄ects of a fail
inspection. Taking the year 2005/06 as an example again, the question addressed is: for schools
failed in September 2005, what is the e⁄ect of the fail inspection on May 2006 test scores?
The evaluation is undertaken by comparing outcomes for schools inspected early in the acad-
emic year, September ￿the treatment group ￿with schools inspected in June, the control group.33
Schools failed in September have had almost a whole academic year to respond to the fail treat-
ment. The identi￿cation problem, that the counterfactual outcome for schools failed in September
is not observed, is solved via comparisons with June failed schools. The details of these compar-
isons are described below.
Descriptive Statistics
A key question is why some schools are inspected earlier in the year than others. The descriptive
analysis in Table 2 helps shed light on this question. This table shows mean characteristics for
primary schools inspected and failed in England in the four years 2005/06 to 2008/09.34 For each
year the ￿rst two columns show means for schools failed early in the academic year (September to
33For an evaluation of the e⁄ects on test scores it is important to note that the latest available test score
information at the time of inspection is the same for both control and treated schools: i.e. from the year before
inspection.
34I focus on these four years because 2005/06 is the ￿rst year when the inspection system moved from one where
schools were given many weeks notice to one where inspectors arrived in schools with a maximum of two days
notice. In order to analyze the e⁄ect of a ￿rst fail (a ￿ fresh fail￿ ) , schools which may have failed in 2004/05 or
earlier are dropped from the analysis. This results in a loss of 10 per cent of schools.
13November35) and those failed late in the year (from mid-May, after the Key Stage 2 test, to mid-
July, before the release of test score results). The former category of schools are the ￿ treatment￿
group and the latter the ￿ control￿group. The ￿rst row simply shows the mean of the month of
inspection. Given the selection rules for the analysis, these are simply June (between 6.1 and 6.2)
and October (between 10.1 and 10.2) for the control and treatment groups, respectively.
The second row, which shows the year of the previous inspection, o⁄ers an explanation why
some schools are inspected early in the year and others later on. For example, for schools failed
in 2005/06 the ￿rst two columns show that the mean year of inspection for late inspected schools
is 2000.6; for early inspected schools it is 2000.1.36 This suggests that schools inspected slightly
earlier in the previous inspection round are also inspected slightly earlier in 2005/06. Table 2
shows that this pattern is typical across all four fail years.37 Thus Table 2 demonstrates that over
the period relevant to this study, the timing of inspection is exogenous: within a given year, the
month of inspection is determined by the timing of the previous inspection.38
The third, fourth and ￿fth rows report the proportion of students receiving a free school meal
(lunch), the proportion of students who are white British and the school￿ s inspection rating from
the previous inspection round. The table demonstrates that for each of the four inspection years
the di⁄erences in means between the treatment and control schools are small and are statistically
insigni￿cant. (The only exception is the previous inspection rating for the year 2008/09.)
Finally, national standardized test scores for the cohort of 11-year olds in the year prior to the
inspection are reported in rows six and seven. Once again, these show no evidence of statistically
signi￿cant di⁄erences between the two groups. It is noteworthy that fail schools perform between
0.4 and 0.5 of one standard deviation below the national mean. This is in line with the idea that
inspectors select schools for the fail treatment at least in part on the basis of past performance.39
35The early inspection category is expanded to three months in order to increase the sample of treated schools.
36Note that an inspection in the academic year 1999/00 is recorded as ￿ 2000￿ ; an inspection in 2000/01 is recorded
as ￿ 2001￿ , and so on.
37Further analysis of the data on timing of inspections shows that in general, over this period, inspectors followed
a mechanical rule with regards to the timing of inspections - schools which were inspected early in the ￿rst inspection
round in the mid-1990s were inspected early in subsequent inspection rounds.
38It should be noted that uncertainty about the exact timing of inspections remains. For example, the standard
deviation for the year of previous inspection is 0.9 years for schools failed in 2005/06 (columns 2 and 3 in Table 2).
39One remaining concern is that the worst schools may be closed down after a fail inspection. If this happens
immediately after an inspection then any test score gains posted by the early fail schools may be due to these
selection e⁄ects. In fact, three pieces of evidence suggest that this is not the case. Although such a ￿ weeding out￿
process may be important in the medium term, the evidence in Table 2 demonstrating the comparability of the
early and late inspected group of schools suggests that such a process does not take place immediately, i.e. in the
year of inspection.
Second, an examination of the data shows that the probability of dropping schools from the estimation sample
because of a lack of test data from the May tests in the year of inspection - perhaps because the school is closed
down - when test data are available in previous years, is similar for treated and control schools. In total, for the
years 2005/06 to 2008/09, 4 per cent of schools (6 schools) from the control group and 5 per cent (14 schools) from
the treatment group are dropped because of lack of test score data in the year of inspection. These schools appear
to be comparable to the treatment and control schools on characteristics such as student attainment in the year
before inspection. For example, the proportion of students attaining the mandated attainment level for age 11
students in the year before inspection is 62 per cent for the 14 treated (early inspected) schools dropped from the
estimation sample; the corresponding mean is 63 per cent for the 258 treated schools included in the estimation
14In sum, the evidence in Table 2 demonstrates that there is little di⁄erence between control
and treatment schools on observable characteristics. This, combined with the fact that timing is
determined by a mechanical rule, suggests that unobservable di⁄erences are also unlikely to exist
between the control and treatment groups.
OLS and Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erences Models
For ease of exposition, I will consider the case of the schools failed in 2005/06 in the months of
September 2005 (the treatment group) and June 2006 (the control group). The analysis extends
to schools failed in the early part of the year (September to November) versus those failed late in
the year (mid-May to mid-July) in each of the four inspection years.
OLS models of the following form are estimated:
yis = ￿ + ￿Ds + Xis￿1 + Ws￿2 + uis; (2)
where yis is the May 2006 test score outcome on the age-11 (Key Stage 2) test for student i attend-
ing school s. The treatment dummy is de￿ned as follows: Ds = 1 if school s is failed in September
2005 and Ds = 0 if the school is failed in June 2006. Xis is a vector of student demographic con-
trols and Ws is a vector of pre-treatment school characteristics. Given the evidence on assignment
to a September inspection versus a June inspection presented in the previous sub-section, it can
be credibly argued that treatment status Ds is uncorrelated with the error term, uis.40
Results are also presented using di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences (DID) models. Continuing with the
example of schools failed in 2005/06, data are taken from 2004/05 (the ￿ pre￿year) and 2005/06
(the ￿ post￿year). The following DID model is estimated:
yist = ￿ + ￿post06 + ￿Dst + Xis￿1 + ￿s + uist; (3)
where t = 2005 or 2006, corresponding to the academic years 2004/05 and 2005/06, respectively.
￿s is a school ￿xed e⁄ect and post06 is a dummy indicator, switched on when t = 2006. Dst is a
time-varying treatment dummy, switched on in the post period (t = 2006) for schools inspected
early in the academic year 2005/06.41
sample.
Finally, a comparison of results for the moderate fail schools versus the severe fail ones also sheds light on this
issue. Note that a moderate fail is unlikely to lead to changes in school leadership and school closure. If test gains
following a fail are observed for moderate fail schools then selection e⁄ects arising from school closures are unlikely
to be driving the results. I report on these ￿ndings are below.
40In a heterogenous treatment e⁄ect setting where ￿i is the student-speci￿c gain from treatment, the key assump-
tion is that Ds is uncorrelated with both uis and ￿i. The evidence presented above suggests that this assumption
is satis￿ed. In this case a comparison of means for the treatment and control outcomes yields the Average E⁄ect
of Treatment on the Treated. This is the e⁄ect of a fail inspection rating for schools inspectors judge to be failing.
Another parameter of policy interest - not estimated - is the Marginal Treatment E⁄ect, i.e. the test score gain for
students in schools on the margin of being failed.
41The key DID assumption, which embodies the assumption of common trends across treatment and control
groups, is that conditional on the school ￿xed e⁄ect (￿s) and year (post06) the treatment dummy Dst is uncorrelated
with the error, i.e. E(uist j ￿s; post06; Dst) = 0.
154.1 Testing for Strategic Behavior
As highlighted in section 2.2 above, a growing body of evidence has demonstrated that when
schools face strong incentives to perform on test scores they game the system. These stratgeies
include the removal of low ability students from the testing pool, teaching to the test and targeting
students close to the mandated pro￿ciency threshold.
In the analysis below, I test for the presence of these types of strategic responses. First, I
examine to what extent gains in test scores following the fail rating are accounted for by selectively
removing low ability students.42 This involves checking whether the estimated e⁄ect of treatment
in the OLS and DID regressions (￿ in equations (2) and (3) above) changes with the inclusion of
student characteristics such as prior test scores, special education needs status, free lunch status
and ethnic background. For example, suppose that in order to raise test performance, fail schools
respond by removing low ability students from the test pool. This would potentially yield large raw
improvements in test scores for treated schools relative to control schools. However, conditioning
on prior test scores would then reveal that these gains are much smaller or non-existent. This test
enables me to directly gauge the e⁄ect of gaming behavior on test scores.43
Second, I test for whether any gains in test scores in the year of the fail inspection are sustained
in the medium term. This provides an indirect test of the extent of teaching to the test. More
precisely, students are enrolled in primary school at the time of the fail inspection. The issue is
whether any gains in test scores observed in that year can still be detected when the students
are tested again at age 14, three years after the students have left the fail primary school. Note
that this is a fairly stringent test of gaming behavior since fade-out of test score gains is typically
observed in settings even when there are no strong incentives to arti￿cially boost test scores (see,
for example, Currie and Thomas, 1995).
Third, I analyze the distributional consequences of a fail inspection. In particular, I investigate
whether there is any evidence that teachers target students on the margin of achieving the key
government target for Year 6 (age 11) students.44 The key headline measure of performance used
by the government and commonly employed to rank schools is the percentage of students attaining
￿ Level 4￿pro￿ciency on the age-11 Key Stage 2 test. Following a fail inspection the incentives to
maximize students passing over the threshold are more intense than prior to the fail rating. If
schools are able to game the system (for example, if inspectors are unable to detect such strategic
behavior) then teachers may target resources towards students on the margin of attaining this
threshold, to the detriment of students far below and far above this critical level.
42It should be noted that potentially distortionary incentives may well exist prior to the fail rating. However,
these incentives become even more powerful once a school is failed. Thus the tests for gaming behaviour outlined
here shed light on the e⁄ects of any extra incentives to game the system following a fail inspection. As noted
previously, the incentives to improve test score performance following a fail inspection are indeed very strong.
43Note that the evidence presented in Table 2 suggests that the school￿ s treatment status is uncorrelated with
observable student characteristics. Hence, although the inclusion covariates may reduce the estimated standard
error of the treatment e⁄ect, we would not expect the inclusion of student background characteristics to change the
estimated coe¢ cient. That is unless the schools are engaging in the type of gaming behaviour highlighted here.
44In primary schools, national tests are administered to students in England at ages seven and 11.
16A number of strategies are adopted to explore this issue. In the ￿rst approach I examine
whether gains in student test scores vary by prior ability. Prior ability predicts the likelihood
of a student attaining the performance threshold. Previous evidence has shown that teachers
neglect students at the bottom of the prior ability distribution in response to the introduction of
performance thresholds (see Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010).
Appendix Table A1 shows the distribution of Year 6 students achieving the target for math-
ematics and English at fail schools, in the year before the fail, by quartile of prior ability. Prior
ability is measured by age seven test scores. As expected, Table A1 shows that ability at age
seven is a strong predictor of whether a student attains the o¢ cial target: the proportion doing
so rises from between a quarter and a third for the bottom quartile to almost 100 percent at
the top quartile of prior ability. As the ￿nal rows of Table A1 show, in the year before the fail
inspection the average number of students achieving the Level 4 threshold is 67 and 72 percent for
mathematics and English, respectively. One implication of the evidence presented in Table A1 is
that students in the lowest ability quartile are the least likely to attain the o¢ cial threshold, and
so at fail schools teachers may substitute e⁄ort away from them towards students in, for example,
the second quartile. The analysis below tests this prediction.
A second approach to analyzing the distributional e⁄ects of a fail rating is to employ quantile
regression analysis. In particular, I investigate distributional e⁄ects within prior ability quartiles.
If teachers set or track students within or among classrooms by ability, then they may target the
marginal students within these ability groups.
Figure 3 illustrates this idea. Suppose that test scores in the absence of a fail treatment
are distributed as in this stylized example. The ￿gure shows the distribution of test scores for
each of the four prior ability quartiles, as well as the proportion of students who pass the o¢ cial
pro￿ciency threshold, labeled ￿ T0￿ . For illustrative purposes, suppose that 20 percent of students
from the bottom quartile attain pro￿ciency; 50, 75 and 90 percent do so in the second, third and
top quartiles, respectively. (These numbers correspond roughly to actual data for fail schools.)
Following a fail inspection, and on the assumption that teachers are able to detect the marginal
students, they may allocate greater e⁄ort towards the students who lie on the boundary of the
shaded area in each of the four charts in Figure 3.
The analysis below tests for such teacher behavior by examining the e⁄ect of treatment at
speci￿c quantiles of the test score distribution. Thus, quantile treatment e⁄ects are estimated
to establish whether or not the largest gains are around the performance threshold boundary, as
predicted by simple theory.
175 Results
5.1 Basic Results
Table 3 shows results for the e⁄ects of a fail inspection on mathematics and English test scores for
schools failed in one of the four academic years, 2006 to 2009.45 The top panel reports results from
the OLS model and the bottom panel reports results from the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences model.
I pool the four inspection years together. Pooling over the four years is justi￿ed because over
this period schools were inspected and rated in a consistent manner.46 The evidence presented in
Table 2 shows that schools are indeed comparable on observable characteristics across the di⁄erent
years. As a robustness check, results from regression analysis conducted for each year separately
are also reported (in the Appendix Tables A2 and A3). As indicated below, these show that results
for the pooled sample and for individual years produce a consistent picture of the e⁄ects of a fail
inspection.
In Table 3, as well as the following tables, the comparison is between students enrolled in
schools failed in the early part of the academic year, September to November - the treatment
group - with those attending schools failed late in the academic year, mid-May to mid-June - the
control group.47
Turning ￿rst to mathematics test scores, the row ￿ early fail￿in Panel A of Table 3 corresponds
to the estimate of the treatment e⁄ect ￿ in equation (2). Column (1) reports estimates from the
simplest mode with only school-level controls.48 The result in column (1) suggests that the e⁄ect
of a fail rating is to raise standardized test scores by 0.12 of a standard deviation. This e⁄ect is
highly statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels (standard errors are clustered at the school
level).
As explained in section 4.1 above, the estimated e⁄ect in column (1) may in part re￿ ect
distortionary behavior by teachers. If schools respond to a fail inspection strategically, for example,
by excluding low ability students from tests via suspensions, then we should see the relatively large
gains in column (1) diminish once prior ability controls are introduced in the regression analysis. In
order to address such concerns, columns (2) and (3) introduce student-level controls. Regression
results reported in column (2) include the following student characteristics: gender; eligibility
for free lunch; special education needs; month of birth; whether ￿rst language is English; ethnic
45Note that ￿ 2006￿refers to the academic year 2005/06 and so on for the other years.
46As described earlier, changes to the inspection process were introduced in September 2005. Arguably, the
biggest change was a move to very short (two days) notice for inspections, down from a notice period of many
months. This regime has remained in place since September 2005.
47Treatment e⁄ects, not reported here to conserve space, estimated for schools failed in each individual month
from September through to April yield a pattern which suggests a steadily declining e⁄ect as we move closer to May.
For example, a comparison of April failed schools with the control group of schools (i.e. schools failed mid-May to
mid-June) reveals e⁄ects which are both small and not statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
48The following school-level controls are included in all the regressions reported in Panel A of Table 3: pre-
inspection math and English attainment; percent of students eligible for free lunch; and percent of students who
are non-white. Dropping these from the regressions makes very little di⁄erence to the estimates. For example,
without any controls at all, the estimated e⁄ect for mathematics is 0.10 of a standard deviation.
18background; and census information on the home neighborhood deprivation index. The model in
column (3) also includes the student￿ s age seven (Key Stage 1) test scores.
The rise in the R-squared statistics as we move from columns (1) to (2) and then to (3) clearly
indicates that student background characteristics and early test scores are powerful predictors of
students￿test outcomes. However, the addition of these controls has little e⁄ect on the estimated
e⁄ects of the fail rating. Overall, the evidence in Panel A for mathematics suggests that (i) the
e⁄ect of a fail inspection is to raise test scores and (ii) this rise does not appear to be driven by
schools selectively excluding students from the tests.
Turning to the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences estimates for mathematics reported in Panel B, a nice
feature of this approach is that it provides direct evidence on the importance of mean reversion.
For the DID analysis, the ￿ pre￿year corresponds to test scores prior to the year of inspection
whilst the ￿ post￿year corresponds to test scores from the year of inspection. The estimate of mean
reversion is provided by the gain in test scores between the pre-inspection year and the year of
inspection for schools failed late in the academic year (i.e. the control group). This estimate is
indicated in the row labeled ￿ post￿ . The DID estimate of the e⁄ect of a fail inspection is provided
in the ￿rst row of Panel B, labeled ￿ post x early fail￿which corresponds to the treatment dummy
Dst in equation (3).
The DID results are in line with the OLS results: column (3) of Panel B shows that students
at early failed schools gain by 0.12 of a standard deviation relative to students enrolled in late
fail schools. In addition, comparing results with and without student-level controls - column (1)
versus columns (2) and (3) - shows that there is little change in the estimated e⁄ect. These results
support the earlier contention that a fail inspection raises student test scores and, that these gains
are unlikely to be accounted for by the kind of strategic behavior outlined above.
As for evidence on mean reversion, the results in the second row of Panel B show that there
is only mild mean reversion for mathematics. With the full set of controls, the coe¢ cients on the
￿ post￿dummy is 0.03 of a standard deviation and is not statistically signi￿cant at conventional
levels. This suggests that in the absence of a fail rating from the inspectors, we should expect very
small gains in test scores from the low levels in the base year reported in the descriptive statistics
in Table 2.
Columns (4) to (6) report results for English test scores. The OLS results in column (6), Panel
A show that the e⁄ect of a fail inspection is to raise standardized test scores by 0.09 of a standard
deviation. The DID estimates in Panel B point to gains of around 0.07 of a standard deviation.
These estimates are statistically signi￿cant. As before, the results for English provide no evidence
of gaming behavior: there is little change in the estimates when we move from the column (4), no
controls, to column (6), full set of controls.
Finally, the evidence on mean reversion of English test scores presented in the second row of
Panel B shows that there is stronger evidence of a re-bound in test scores from the low level in the
base year. The coe¢ cients on the ￿ post￿dummy is now 0.08 of a standard deviation, indicating
a substantial re-bound in test scores even in the absence of a fail inspection. As seen below, this
19re-bound in fact corresponds to a ￿ pre-program￿dip observed in the year before inspection.49
Falsi￿cation Test and the ￿ Pre-Program Dip￿
Table 4 presents analysis from a falsi￿cation exercise. This makes use of the fact that data are
available one and two years before treatment in order to conduct a placebo study. The question
addressed is: when we compare the treatment and control groups in the year before treatment,
can we detect a treatment e⁄ect when in fact there was none?
Table 4 pools the data over the four inspection years. The OLS estimates in Panel A compare
test score outcomes in the year before inspection for students at early and late failed schools.
Focusing on columns (3) and (6) with the full set of controls, these show that the estimated e⁄ect
of the placebo treatment is close to zero and statistically insigni￿cant for mathematics and English.
The DID estimates in Panel B, which compare the change in test scores one and two years before
inspection for early and late failed schools, also show no evidence of placebo e⁄ects, supporting
the common trends assumption underlying the DID strategy.50
Finally, Table 4 also provides evidence on the preprogran dip in test scores, presented in the
row labeled ￿ post￿in Panel B. The results in column (3) for English show that there is a large,
statistically signi￿cant decline in test scores in the year prior to the fail rating which cannot
be explained by student characteristics or their prior test scores. This sheds some light on the
selection rule employed by inspectors: for English at least, this evidence suggests that inspectors
are more likely to fail schools which have had a recent dip in test score performance.
5.2 Heterogeneous Treatment E⁄ects
In this section I explore the distributional consequences of a fail inspection. The analysis below
￿rst assesses whether the treatment e⁄ect varies by prior ability. The discussion then turns to
quantile treatment e⁄ects, followed by some further subgroup analysis.
E⁄ects by Prior Ability
As discussed in section 4.1 above, variation in treatment e⁄ect by prior ability may provide
evidence of distortionary teacher behavior. In order to test the prediction that low ability students
are adversely a⁄ected when incentives to attain the performance threshold are strengthened, I test
whether the e⁄ect of treatment varies with prior ability.51 The following model incorporating the
49Note that the above results from data pooled over the four inspection years are in line with results from
regression analysis conducted for each year separately, reported in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. For example, the
results in each of the columns labeled (3) in Table A2 show that the e⁄ect of a fail inspection on mathematics test
scores ranges between 0.06 and 0.15 of a standard deviation across all four years and both OLS and DID estimation
strategies.
50Results for individual inspection years con￿rm the ￿nding that the placebo treatment produces no discernible
e⁄ect.
51Appendix Table A1, discussed in section 4.1, highlighted the relationship between prior ability - measured by
the age-seven Key Stage 1 test score - and the probability of attaining the target level on the age-11 Key Stage 2
test. This showed that only around a quarter to one third of students in the lowest prior ability quartile attain the
stipulated Level 4.
20interaction between the treatment dummy and prior ability is estimated:
yis = ￿ + ￿Ds + ￿:Percentileis ￿ Ds + Xis￿1 + Ws￿2 + ￿3Percentileis + uis; (4)
where the treatment dummy Ds is turned on for schools inspected early in the academic year.
Percentileis is student i￿ s percentile, within the the selected sample of fail schools, in the prior
test score distribution (the age-seven Key Stage 1 test). Thus, the coe¢ cient on the interaction
between the treatment dummy and the test percentile, ￿, estimates how the e⁄ect of treatment
varies by prior ability.
The e⁄ect may in fact vary non-linearly by prior ability. This will be the case if, for example,
teachers target students in the middle of the prior test score distribution and neglect students at
the top and bottom. In order to allow for such non-linear interactions the following regression is
also estimated:
yis = ￿ + ￿Ds +
4 X
k=2
￿kQiskDs + Xis￿1 + Ws￿2 +
4 X
k=2
￿3kQisk + uis; (5)
where the dummy variable Qisk is switched on for student i if her percentile on the prior test score
lies in quartile k. Thus, ￿k estimates the e⁄ect of treatment for students lying in quartile k in the
prior ability distribution, relative to the omitted category, the bottom quartile.
Table 5, columns (1) and (3), presents estimates of the main (￿) and interaction (￿) e⁄ects
for mathematics and English, respectively, for the linear interactions model (4). The row ￿ early
fail￿corresponds to the estimate of ￿ and ￿ early fail x prior ability percentile￿corresponds to the
estimate of ￿. The results for both mathematics and English in columns (1) and (3) show that
there is a strong inverse relationship between prior ability and the gains from treatment. Students
from the lowest end of the prior ability distribution gain 0.19 and 0.15 of a standard deviation for
mathematics and English, respectively.
The estimates for the nonlinear interactions model, equation (5), are reported in columns (2)
and (4).52 Allowing for non-linearities leaves the above conclusion unchanged: the biggest gains
are posted for students from the bottom quartile (the omitted category); students in the middle
of the prior ability distribution also experience substantial gains, though not as large as the ones
for low ability students. At 0.05 and 0.03 of a standard deviation for mathematics and English,
respectively, gains for students in the top quartile appear to be positive, though substantially
smaller than for those at lower ability levels.
One explanation that may account for the relatively small gains observed for high ability
students is that their test scores are at or close to the ceiling of 100 percent attainment. However,
it should be noted that even for students in the highest ability quartile at fail schools, the mean
test scores in the year before treatment are some way below the 100 percent mark (76 percent and
52Note that running four separate regressions by prior ability quartile subgroup leads to results virtually identical
to those reported in columns (2) and (4) of Table 5.
2168 percent for mathematics and English, respectively). This hypothesis that ceiling e⁄ects bite is
explored further (and rejected) in the quantile treatment e⁄ect analysis below.
In summary, the results presented in Table 5 show that low ability students reap relatively
large test score gains from a fail inspection. This is in contrast to ￿ndings from some strands of
the test-based accountability literature which show that low ability students may su⁄er under such
regimes.53 One explanation for the ￿ndings reported here may lie in the role played by inspectors.
I discuss this at greater length below.
Quantile Treatment E⁄ects
This section further explores distributional e⁄ects by examining how the conditional distrib-
ution of test scores is a⁄ected by treatment at each quantile ￿ 2 [0;1]. The following model is
estimated:
Q￿(yis j :) = ￿￿ + ￿￿Ds + Xis￿1￿ + Ws￿2￿; (6)
where Q￿(: j :) is the ￿th conditional quantile function and ￿￿ is the quantile treatment e⁄ect
at quantile ￿. Figure 4 plots ￿￿ as well as the associated 95 percent con￿dence interval. For
mathematics, Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the e⁄ect of a fail inspection is to raise national
standardized test scores by between 0.08 and 0.13 of a standard deviation at all quantiles. For
English (Panel B) the e⁄ect varies between 0.05 and 0.1 of a standard deviation, with the largest
e⁄ects recorded for quantiles below 0.7. In addition, the evidence from Figure 4 tends to reject
the hypothesis that teachers act strategically to raise performance of students on the margin of
attaining the o¢ cial government target.54
Importantly, the pattern of treatment e⁄ects across quantiles reported in Figure 4 tends to
reject the notion that ceiling e⁄ects bite. If this was the case then high scoring students would not
post gains from treatment. In fact the ￿gure shows that even at high quantiles, treatment e⁄ects
remain large, certainly for mathematics.
Next, I investigate quantile treatment e⁄ects within prior ability subgroups. I focus on quantile
treatment e⁄ects within each prior ability quartile. There are two justi￿cations for this. First, the
evidence in Table 5 points to heterogenous gains across these four ability groups. It is possible that
within these subgroups, teachers target students who are on the margin of attaining the perfor-
mance threshold rather than the average student. Quantile regression analysis will provide some
evidence on this issue. Second, looking for heterogeneous e⁄ects within prior ability subgroups
accords with the notion that teachers may set (track) students within (among) classes by ability.
53For example, Neal and Schanzenbach (2002) ￿nd that test scores improve for students in the middle of the
prior ability distribution whilst low ability students experience zero or even negative e⁄ects on test scores.
54Recall that the evidence in Appendix Table A1 shows that at fail schools, around 70 per cent of students attain
the government￿ s target for mathematics and English in the year prior to the inspection. Thus, if teachers can
identify and strategically target the marginal students we would expect the treatment e⁄ect to peak at around
quantile 0.3. Broadly speaking, this does not appear to be the case: for mathematics the treatment e⁄ects are
relatively stable across most of the test score distribution; for English the treatment e⁄ect is stable up to quantile
0.7, with evidence of some decline at higher quantiles.
22The incentives they face suggest that they may target e⁄ort towards marginal students within
these subgroups.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the quantile treatment e⁄ects within each prior ability quartile, for math-
ematics and English, respectively. These demonstrate that there is a great deal of heterogeneity
in estimated e⁄ects within each quartile. Perhaps the most marked heterogeneity is for students
in the bottom prior ability quartile, where the treatment e⁄ect for mathematics rises steadily
from around 0.1 of a standard deviation for the lowest quantiles to just below 0.3 for the highest
quantiles (Figure 5, Panel A). For English, Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the treatment e⁄ect
is around 0.1 of a standard deviation for students below the median of the test score distribution
and close to 0.2 for students above the median.
One explanation for the pattern of results reported in Panel A of Figures 5 and 6 is that teachers
target the students on the margin of attaining the performance threshold.55 The evidence does
not generally support this hypothesis. First, it should be noted that Panel A, Figure 5 and Panel
A, Figure 6 demonstrate that there are substantial gains for students even at low quantiles, i.e.
students quite far from the performance threshold post large gains from the treatment. In addition,
the evidence from the remaining three panels (prior ability quartiles 2, 3 and 4) in each of Figures
5 and 6 does not generally support the view that teachers target the marginal students.56
Further Subgroup Analysis
Table 6 reports results from separate regressions for subgroups determined by free lunch status
and whether English is the ￿rst language spoken at home. The results by free lunch status suggest
modestly higher gains in mathematics for free lunch students but smaller gains for this group
relative to no-free lunch students in English. However, there are large di⁄erences in gains for
students according to whether or not their ￿rst language is English. For mathematics, students
whose ￿rst language is not English record gains of 0.19 of a standard deviation, compared to 0.12
of standard deviation for those whose ￿rst language is English. Similarly, gains on the English
test are 0.12 of a standard deviation (though only marginally signi￿cant) for the ￿rst group of
students and 0.08 of a standard deviation for the latter group.57
Discussion: Explaining the Gains for Low Ability Students
55As indicated in Appendix Table A1, these students are likely to be in the higher quantiles of the test score
distribution: Appendix Table A1 shows that in the year before the fail inspection 23 per cent and 33 per cent
of students reach the mathematics and English threshold, respectively. Thus, if teachers successfully target the
marginal students, we would expect to see the largest gains at quantiles 0.77 (mathematics) and 0.67 (English).
56For example, for the second quartile prior ability subgroup the evidence in Table A1 indicates test gains should
peak around quantile 0.4 for mathematics and English. Panel B of Figure 5 shows some support for this but the
English results in Panel B, Figure 6 show no evidence of such behavior. Similarly, for students in the third prior
ability quartile the descriptive statistics in Table A1 indicate that if teachers are behaving strategically then test
performance gains should peak around quantile 0.1 or 0.2 for mathematics and English and decline thereafter. The
evidence in Panel C in each of Figures 5 and 6 shows no such pattern.
57Dustmann et al (2010) show that even though students from most minority groups lag behind white British
students upon entry to compulsory schooling, they catch up strongly in the subsequent years. The relatively large
gains for this subgroup reported in Table 6 suggest that one mechanism driving the results reported in Dustmann
et al may be the school inspection system.
23The analysis above points to strong gains on the age 11 (Key Stage 2) test for students classed
as low ability on the prior (age seven) test. On the basis of the evidence presented above, two
potential explanations for this ￿nding can be rejected. First, these gains for low ability students
do not appear to be a result of teachers strategically allocating e⁄ort among students. Second, it
also seems unlikely that ceiling e⁄ects for high ability students account for this result. So what
then explains the gains for low ability students reported in Table 5 and the shape of the quantile
treatment e⁄ects in Panel A, Figure 5 and Panel A, Figure 6?
One explanation that ￿ts the facts is the argument that there may be a great deal of hetero-
geneity within the same school and even the same classroom in the degree to which parents are
able to hold teachers to account. Parents of children scoring low on the age seven test are likely
poorer than average and less able to assess their child￿ s progress and the quality of instruction
provided by the school. Teachers may therefore exert lower levels of e⁄ort for students whose
parents are less vocal about quality of instruction. Following a fail inspection and the subsequent
increased oversight of schools, teachers raise e⁄ort. This rise in e⁄ort may be greatest where pre-
viously there was the greatest slack. Thus lower ability students, whose parents face the highest
costs in terms of assessing teaching quality, may gain the most from a fail inspection. This would
then help explain the strong rise for low ability students, as reported in Table 5.
Furthermore, if students in the low prior ability group do indeed receive greater attention
from teachers following a fail inspection, the expectation may be that within this group, students
with higher innate ability bene￿t the most. This would accord with the usual assumption that
investment and student ability are complementary in the test score production function. This is
exactly in line with the results of Panel A, Figure 5 and Panel A, Figure 6, which show rising
treatment e⁄ects across quantiles for students in the lowest prior ability quartile.58
5.3 Medium-Term E⁄ects
The results reported above show that a fail inspection leads to test score gains for age-11 (Year
6) students, who are in the last year of primary school. One question is whether these gains are
sustained following the move to secondary school. This would provide indirect evidence of whether
the initial test score gains at the primary school are due to ￿ teaching to the test￿rather than a
result of greater mastery or deeper understanding of the material being examined. In the former
case, any gains would be expected to dissipate quickly.59
58This interpretation of the results is also supported by the subgroup analysis of Table 6, which shows that
children from poorer, minority groups tend to gain relatively more from the fail inspection. Children from families
where English is not the ￿rst language at home most likely have parents who are less able to interrogate teachers
and hold them accountable. The results in Table 6 boost the conclusion that it is children from these sorts of
families who are helped most by the fail inspection.
59Note that such fadeout of initial gains is in fact common in settings even where educators are not under pressure
to arti￿cially distort measured student performance (see for example Currie and Thomas, 1995). Thus, the fading
of test score gains does not necessarily indicate distortionary response on the part of teachers. On the other hand,
if some of the initial test score gains persist in to the medium term then this would suggest that the initial gains
from the fail treatment are ￿ real￿ .
24Table 7 reports results for the Key Stage 3 test score outcome for students aged 14 (Year 9),
i.e. three years after leaving the fail primary school. This exercise is limited by the fact that these
tests are teacher assessments (and not externally marked, as is the case for Key Stage 2 tests used
in the analysis above) and are currently only available for students at primary schools failed in
2006 (Key Stage 3 test taken in 2009) and 2007 (Key Stage 3 test taken in 2010). This leads to
a reduced sample size, relative to the earlier analysis of Key Stage 2 test outcomes. In order to
reduce noise, mathematics and English test scores are combined into a single measure by taking
the mean for the two tests for each student.
The results in column 1 of Table 7 suggest that the mean e⁄ect of treatment three years after
leaving the fail primary school is a gain in test score of 0.05 of a standard deviation (statistically
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level). Analysis of heterogeneity in treatment impact suggests that
the medium-term gains are largest for lower ability students (columns 2 and 3), in line with earlier
results showing large gains for these groups in the year of inspection.
Overall, the analysis of test scores three years after the treatment show that the positive e⁄ects
are not as large as the immediate impacts, suggesting fadeout is an important factor. Nevertheless,
the evidence shows that some of the gains do persist in to the medium term.
5.4 Mechanisms
Having ruled out certain types of gaming behvaior, this section provides tentative evidence on what
might be driving test score improvements at failed schools. First, I investigate whether moderate
and severe fail ratings - each of which entails di⁄erent degrees of intervention following the fail
inspection - yield markedly di⁄erent outcomes. Second, using teacher survey data, I examine
whether fail schools experience changes in teacher tenure, curriculum and classroom discipline.
E⁄ects by Severity of Fail
As discussed in Section 2, the overall fail rating can be sub-divided into a moderate fail and
a severe fail: the ￿ Notice to Improve￿and ￿ Special Measures￿sub-categories, respectively. It was
noted above that the moderate fail rating leads to increased oversight by the inspectors but does
not entail other dramatic changes in inputs or school principal and teacher turnover. Schools
subject to the severe fail category, on the other hand, may well experience higher resources as well
as changes in the school leadership team and the school￿ s governing board.
Table 8 shows the e⁄ects on test scores separately for schools receiving a moderate fail (columns
1 and 2) and severe fail (columns 3 and 4). For moderate fail schools, the OLS (di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence) estimates suggest gains of 0.16 (0.11) and 0.07 (0.03) of a standard deviation for math-
ematics and English, respectively. For the severe fail treatment, the OLS (di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence)
estimates show gains of 0.10 (0.11) and 0.13 (0.15) of a standard deviation for mathematics and
English, respectively.
The ￿nding that there are test score gains - certainly for mathematics - at both moderate and
severe fail schools is noteworthy. Given that large injections of additional resources and personnel
25changes are less likely at moderate fail schools than at sever fail schools, the ￿ndings in Table 8
point to greater e⁄ort and increased e¢ ciency as the key mechanism behind gains for the former
group.60
Classroom Discipline, School Curriculum and Teacher Tenure
In this section I use a survey of teachers to investigate whether a fail rating leads to changes
in the following outcomes (i) classroom discipline, (ii) hours of the curriculum allocated to high-
and low-stakes subjects and (iii) teacher tenure. In one set of regression results, schools rated
￿ Satisfactory￿ , the rating just above the fail category, are used to construct the control group. A
second control group is constructed using schools which are ￿ yet-to-be-failed￿ .
The teacher survey data are part of a major longitudinal study, the Millennium Cohort Study,
which follows children born in the UK in or just after the year 2000. In the fourth wave of the
study the primary school teacher of the study child was contacted and surveyed in one of the
academic years 2007/08 or 2008/09. A small set of questions in the survey relate to the teacher￿ s
tenure at the school, years of experience, school curriculum and classroom discipline.
Table 9 reports results for the classroom discipline outcome.61 For each of the columns, (1) to
(4), the ￿ Fail 2004 - 2007￿dummy is switched on if the teacher is at a school which was failed in
one of the academic years 2003/04 to 2006/07 (i.e. before the survey date).
In columns (1) and (2) the control group consists of teachers at schools which were rated
￿ Satisfactory￿between 2003/04 and 2006/07. In columns (3) and (4) a di⁄erent control group is
constructed using teachers at schools which are failed after the interview, namely in 2009/10 or
2010/11. These are the ￿ yet-to-be-failed￿schools.62
Column (1) shows that the raw di⁄erence in teacher-reported discipline problems are lower
at schools which experienced a fail rating in the recent past than at schools which received a
Satisfactory rating. This gap is substantial (5.5 percentage points) but not statistically signi￿cant.
When school controls are included in column (2), this gap widens to 8.0 percentage points and
is signi￿cant at the 10 percent level.63 This is a large e⁄ect, representing a 20 percent decline in
this measure of indiscipline. One interpretation of this evidence is that teachers in treated schools
places greater emphasis on classroom discipline and ensure that fewer students behave in a way
60One other notable feature of the results in Table 8 worth highlighting is the contrasting nature of mean reversion
in the moderate and severe fail categories. The extent of reversion-to-mean for the control groups is depicted in
the ￿ post￿row of Table 8. For the moderate fail schools, there appears to be substantial mean reversion: there is
bounce back, compared to the prior year, in mathematics and English test scores for the moderate fail schools of
0.06 and 0.14 of a standard deviation, respectively. For the severe fail schools, however, there is no bounce back.
One interpretation of this evidence is that inspectors are able to distinguish between poorly performing schools and
the very worst performing schools, with the latter category exhibiting no improvements in the absence of treatment.
61The precise question in the survey is: ￿ Are there any children in the study child￿ s class whose behaviour in
class prevents other children from learning?￿(check Yes or No).
62Any schools which were also failed in one of the previous inspection cycles between 2003/04 and 2008/09 are
dropped from this control group.
63School controls included in the regression: percentage of students eligible for a free lunch, the school￿ s national
test score percentile and type of school.
26that impedes other children from learning.64 The second set of results, reported in columns (3)
and (4) are consistent with the previous results, although the standard errors are now substantially
larger.65
Appendix Table A4 shows the e⁄ect of a fail inspection on teacher tenure and experience
(columns 1 to 4) as well as number of hours devoted each week to English, mathematics and
physical education (columns 5 to 10). The point estimates for teacher tenure and experience
suggest very small di⁄erences between teachers in treatment and control schools. For example,
lower tenure of 0.198 of a year for the treatment group represents a decline in tenure of less that 3
percent (mean tenure at control schools is 7.3 years). This suggests that higher teacher turnover
is unlikely to be the mechanism behind the positive test score gains at fail schools. Di⁄erences in
experience are even smaller. However, due to the relative small sample size, standard errors are
large and hence larger e⁄ects cannot be ruled out. Similarly, the point estimates for the curriculum
outcomes suggest small e⁄ects from the treatment: there appears to be a 2 (5) percent decline
(increase) in hours devoted to math (English) and a 4 percent decline in hours devoted to physical
education. In part, this ￿nding may be a consequence of the fact that the national curriculum in
England is set nationally.
Overall, the analysis presented here further boosts the hypothesis that greater e⁄ort on the
part of the current stock of teachers at the fail school is at least part of the explanation for the
test score gains reported in this study. However, without more detailed survey information on
school practices, hiring policies and teacher turnover it is not possible to go beyond the tentative
evidence provided here.
6 Conclusion
How best to design incentives for public organizations such as schools is a fundamental public
policy issue. One solution, performance evaluation on the basis of test scores, is prevalent in many
countries. This paper evaluates an alternative approach, school inspections, which may better
capture the multifaceted nature of education production. A key concern under such a regime is
that it is open to manipulation by the bureaucrats charged with oversight.
The ￿rst set of results in this study demonstrate that inspector ratings are correlated with
underlying measures of school quality - constructed using survey measures from the school￿ s current
stock of students and parents - even after conditioning on standard observed school characteristics.
The evidence suggests that inspectors are able to discriminate between more and less e⁄ective
schools, and, signi￿cantly, report on their ￿ndings in a setting where the stakes are high. Thus,
this aspect of school inspections - simply disseminating inspection ratings and reports - may help
64This result is unlikely to be driven by student selection into schools. Hussain (2009) shows that enrolment
declines following a fail inspection. More motivated parents are more likely to switch schools, in which case discipline
should deteriorate following a fail inspection.
65As a robustness check, using di⁄erent sample selection rules, e.g. 2005/06 and 2006/07 Fail and Satisfactory
schools, yields qualitatively similar results, though the reduction in sample size results in larger standard errors.
27relax information constraints facing consumers and other decision makers. Such constraints are
thought to be pervasive in the public sector.66
The main body of this study is concerned with evaluating the causal e⁄ect of a fail inspection
on test scores. Employing a novel strategy to address the classic mean reversion problem, the
basic ￿nding is that a fail inspection leads to test score improvements of around 0.1 of a standard
deviation. These results are robust to di⁄erent methods of estimation: simple comparisons of
post-treatment outcomes for the control and treatment groups as well as di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
models yield very similar results.
Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that schools are able to arti￿cially in￿ ate test
performance by gaming the system. Given the prior evidence on strategic behavior in similar
high stakes contexts, the fact that I ￿nd little evidence of dysfunctional response is revealing. If
inspectors are able to successfully evaluate actual practices and quality of instruction in place at
the school, both before and after a fail inspection, inspections may well have a mitigating e⁄ect
on such distortionary responses.
Finally, examining treatment heterogeneity reveals that gains are especially large for students
scoring low on the prior (age seven) test. The gains are large when compared to other possible
policy interventions, such as the e⁄ects of attending a school with higher attainment levels (Hast-
ings et al, 2009) or enrolling in a charter school (Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2011). These results are
consistent with the view that children of low income parents - arguably, the least vocal in holding
teachers to account - bene￿t the most from inspections. Consequently, the ￿ndings of this study
may be especially relevant in the current policy environment where, ￿rst, there is heightened con-
cern about raising standards for this group of children and, second, they are hard to reach using
other policy levers.67
These ￿ndings are noteworthy given the prior empirical evidence suggesting that subjective
assessments may give rise to various kinds of biases. For example, subjective evaluations of workers
may lead to ￿ leniency￿and ￿ centrality￿bias in private sector ￿rms (Prendergast, 1999) . Evidence
from the public sector points to bureaucrats indulging their preferences when allowed to exercise
discretion (Heckman et al, 1996).68 Although such biases in inspector behavior cannot be ruled
out, this study demonstrates that the inspection system appears to be e⁄ective along the following
two dimensions: ￿rst, inspectors produce ratings which are valid and, second, they are able to
identify poorly performing schools, leading to test score gains. One important di⁄erence between
the bureaucrats in charge of school inspections and those charged with allocating training in the
66For example, on the e⁄ects of relaxing information constraints on families￿school choices, see Hastings and
Weinstein (2008).
67For example, a ￿ hard to reach￿group may be students whose parents choose not to participate in a voucher
program or apply for a spot in a charter school. On the other hand, the most robust evidence in the current literature
usually focuses on children of motivated parents who are active in such programs. The most credible studies tend
to make use of lottery assignment to determine, for example, the e⁄ects of attending a higher performing school
(Hastings et al, 2009; Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2011).
68Heckman et al (1996) show that in the context of a job training program, case workers ignore the overall
performance standard set for the training center, and instead enroll the least advantaged and least employable
applicants into the program.
28Heckman et al (1996) study is that the key inspector output - an inspection rating and report -
is available on the internet for public consumption. Consequently, inspector decisions themselves
may be subject to scrutiny and oversight. One hypothesis for future research is that this is a key
element in driving the positive results found in this study.
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32Figure 1 - Relative Test Score Performance at Fail Schools, 2005/06 Inspections: Causal 
Effect or Mean Reversion? 
 
 
Notes: Figure shows the percentage of students attaining the government’s performance threshold, ‘Level 4’, on 
the age-11 Key Stage 2 mathematics test for fail and non-fail schools. Each year represents an academic year 
(e.g. 2002 corresponds to 2001/02). The figure shows that between 2000 and 2005, test score performance 
declined at schools inspected and failed in 2006 relative to schools rated satisfactory or better in the same 
inspection year. There is a dramatic pickup in performance at failed schools both in the year of inspection and 
subsequently. (Note that inspections are undertaken throughout the academic year, September through to July. 
The test is administered in May of each year. Thus, test score information is typically not available for the year 
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33Figure 2: Time line showing treatment and control schools for academic year 2005/06
Note: This time line depicts two groups of schools: those failed in September and those failed in June. Also shown is the
month (May) in which the national age‐11 Key Satge 2 tests are taken and the month when the results are leased (July). See
section III for details.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inspection rating ‐ 0.219** ‐0.134** ‐0.126** ‐0.103** ‐0.085**
 (range: 1 = Oustanding, 4 = Fail) (0.0191) (0.0201) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0210)
Test score percentile 0.0050** 0.0038** 0.0029** 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009)
0.323 ‐0.049 ‐0.073 ‐0.299
(0.1904) (0.1855) (0.1840) (0.1965)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Respondent b/g controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Previous insp. rating No No No Yes Yes
Observations 10012 10012 10012 10012 9841
R‐squared 0.035 0.084 0.146 0.149 0.152
Notes: Standard errors are reported in brackets; clustered at the school-level. ** and * denote significance at 1% and
5% level, respectively. The dependent variable is a z-score computed from: the student-level mean across six
questions relating to teacher practices (columns 1 to 4); and parent-level mean across five questions relating to
parental satisfaction (column 5). The inspection rating corresponds to the first inspection after the year of the survey
(2004). Inspection ratings prior to the survey are included as additional controls in columns (4) and (5). School’s
national percentile on test score calculated using the proportion of students achieving five A*-C grades on the age 16
GCSE exams in 2004. Additional school controls (columns 2-5): dummies for type of school (Community, Voluntary
Controlled, Voluntary Aided, Foundation) and log of total enrolment. Respondents’ background controls in columns
(3) to (5): student’s prior test score (Key Stage 2 test, taken at age 11 in primary school); female dummy; whether
has a long-standing illness or disability; ethnic background; parents’ education, income, economic activity and
whether in receipt of various government benefits; whether a single parent household; and number of children in the




















































Month of inspection 6.17 10.19 0.000** 6.07 10.22 0.000** 6.16 10.24 0.000** 6.23 10.14 0.000**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
Year of previous inspection 2000.6 2000.1 0.004** 2002.2 2001.5 0.001** 2004.1 2003.4 0.001** 2006.0 2005.0 0.001**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.05) (0.23)
26.8 23.5 0.336 22.8 25.2 0.409 25.6 24.6 0.807 21.6 19.8 0.665
(2.99) (1.92) (2.45) (1.67) (3.36) (2.06) (3.34) (2.29)
% students white British 78.2 82.4 0.338 78.1 77.4 0.881 75.5 83.3 0.183 68.9 75.3 0.420
(4.23) (2.26) (4.34) (3.00) (5.56) (3.06) (7.09) (4.43)
2.20 2.33 0.271 2.33 2.46 0.302 2.42 2.33 0.513 2.82 2.38 0.004**
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Age 11 standardised test 
scores, year before Fail 
    Mathematics ‐0.43 ‐0.39 0.667 ‐0.40 ‐0.43 0.636 ‐0.47 ‐0.49 0.785 ‐0.36 ‐0.45 0.354
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)
    English ‐0.42 ‐0.40 0.827 ‐0.42 ‐0.48 0.297 ‐0.51 ‐0.49 0.756 ‐0.36 ‐0.37 0.954
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06)
Number of schools 41 83 42 81 31 59 22 35
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Schools failed for the first time in the academic year indicated. ‘Early inspected’ schools are those failed in the early part of the academic year










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
early Fail 0.120** 0.127** 0.130** 0.082* 0.090** 0.090**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.038) (0.029) (0.029)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age‐7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.04 0.27 0.49 0.04 0.32 0.53
Observations 16617 16617 16617 16502 16502 16502
Number of schools 394 394 394 394 394 394
Panel B: Difference‐in‐differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post x early Fail 0.117** 0.113** 0.117** 0.080* 0.075* 0.072*
(0.033) (0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036)
post 0.014 0.038 0.028 0.061 0.085** 0.078**
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age 7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.07 0.24 0.49 0.08 0.31 0.54
Observations 33730 33730 33730 33386 33386 33386
Number of schools 394 394 394 394 394 394
Notes: Standard errors reported in brackets; * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
S.e.’s clustered at the school level. OLS and DID models estimated for schools rated Fail in the years 2006 to
2009. ‘Early Fail’ dummy switched on for schools failed September to November; switched off for schools failed
mid‐May to mid‐July. The dummy ‘post’ is turned on for the year of inspection and off for the previous year.
Controls for student characteristics: dummies for female; eligibility for free lunch; special education needs;
month of birth; first language is English; ethnic group; and census information on local neighborhood
deprivation (IDACI score). Missing dummies included for student characteristics and age‐7 test scores. All OLS







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
early Fail ‐0.018 ‐0.006 ‐0.001 ‐0.016 0.000 0.007
(0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age 7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.000 0.252 0.501 0.000 0.316 0.549
Observations 17113 17113 17113 16884 16884 16884
Number of schools 394 394 394 394 394 394
Panel B: Difference‐in‐differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post x early Fail ‐0.000 0.002 0.003 ‐0.012 0.004 0.008
(0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
post ‐0.049* ‐0.026 ‐0.033 ‐0.101** ‐0.072* ‐0.081**
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age 7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.001 0.232 0.495 0.003 0.300 0.546
Observations 34838 34838 34838 34390 34390 34390
Number of schools 394 394 394 394 394 394
Notes: Standard errors reported in brackets; * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
S.e.’s clustered at the school level. OLS and DID models estimated for schools rated Fail in the years 2006 to
2009. ‘Early Fail’ dummy switched on for schools failed September to November; switched off for schools failed
mid‐May to mid‐July. The dummy ‘post’ is turned on in the year before inspection and off two years before the






41(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear Non‐linear Linear Non‐linear
early Fail 0.193** 0.198** 0.147** 0.141**









Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14387 14387 14429 14429





Notes: Standard errors reported in brackets; * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1%
levels, respectively. S.e.’s clustered at the school level. Outcome variable: age 11 (Key Stage 2)
national standardized test scores. Each column reports results from an OLS model estimated for
schools rated Fail in the years 2006 to 2009. Prior ability percentile calculated using age 7 (Key
Stage 1) mathematics and writing tests. Students with missing age 7 test scores dropped from
the sample. All regressions include full set of student‐ and school‐level controls; see notes to
Table 3 for details. Regressions in columns (1) and (3) also include prior ability percentile as
control; regressions in columns (2) and (4) include prior ability quartile.







early Fail 0.121** 0.114** 0.136** 0.115** 0.187**
(0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.029) (0.066)
Observations 16617 12852 3705 14289 2268
Number of schools 394 394 384 392 296
R‐squared 0.486 0.476 0.454 0.505 0.390








early Fail 0.083** 0.088** 0.057 0.081** 0.120
(0.030) (0.030) (0.043) (0.030) (0.074)
Observations 16502 12818 3628 14230 2216
Number of schools 394 394 384 392 294
R‐squared 0.530 0.520 0.489 0.553 0.398
Mean standardized ‐ 0.42 ‐0.30 ‐0.85 ‐0.39 ‐0.58
test score
Table 6: Subgroup Estimates of the Effect of a Fail Inspection on Test Scores
Notes: Standard errors reported in brackets; * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. S.e.’s
clustered at the school level. Outcome variable: age 11 (Key Stage 2) national standardized test scores. Each column
reports results from an OLS model estimated for schools rated Fail in the years 2006 to 2009. All regressions include full set












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
early Fail 0.048
+ 0.056 0.069* 0.053
+ 0.017 0.051
+ 0.060









Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10047 8948 8948 7685 2324 8594 1415




Notes: Standard errors reported in brackets; + , * and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. S.e.’s clustered at the
school level. Combined mathematics and English outcome measured three years after leaving the (failed) primary school. Thus, age 14 (Key Stage
3) mathematics and English attainment is derived from secondary school teacher assessments in 2008/09 (for students who attended primary
schools failed in 2005/06) and 2009/10 (students who attended primary schools failed in 2006/07). All regressions include full set of student‐ and
school‐level controls; see notes to Table 3 for details. For columns (2) and (3) students with missing age 7 test scores are dropped from the
sample.
44(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS  Math English Math English
early Fail 0.157** 0.074
+ 0.097* 0.126**
(0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040)
R‐squared 0.49 0.53 0.48 0.54
Observations 8695 8596 7150 7136
No. of schools 211 211 175 175
Diff‐in‐diff Math English Math English
post x early Fail 0.111* 0.029 0.110** 0.147**
(0.045) (0.051) (0.042) (0.050)
post 0.063
+ 0.135** ‐0.001 ‐0.001
(0.036) (0.042) (0.032) (0.042)
R‐squared 0.50 0.54 0.49 0.54
Observations 17642 17449 14529 14392




Notes: Standard errors reported in brackets; + , * and ** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively. S.e.’s clustered at the school level. Moderate fail
corresponds to the ‘Notice to improve’ fail rating. Severe fail corresponds to the ‘Special
measures’ fail rating. See text for details. All regressions include full set of student
background controls. OLS estimates in top half of table also include school‐level controls;
see notes to Table 3 for details. Diff‐in‐diff estimates include school fixed effects. 8 fail
schools included in Table 3 but with no information on category of failure (moderate
versus severe) are excluded from this estimation sample.
45(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fail (2004 ‐ 2007) ‐0.055 ‐0.80
+ ‐0.067 ‐0.085





Observations 872 872 204 204
R‐squared 0.001 0.041 0.005 0.062
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in brackets; + , * and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively. Control group in columns (1) and (2) consists of teachers at schools attaining 
a ‘Satisfactory’ rating in the years 2004 – 2007; control group in columns (3) and (4) consists of teachers
at schools failed in the years 2009 or 2010. ‘Fail (2004‐2007)’ dummy turned on for schools failed 2004


























Notes: This table shows the proportion of students attaining the
government attainment target ‐ Level 4 ‐ for Year 6 students on
the Key Stage 2 test. Prior ability is measured by Year 2 (age 7)
Mathematics and Writing test scores. The sample consists of all
students in the year before the fail inspection at schools failed
between 2006 and 2009. Students with missing age seven test
scores are dropped, and so the total sample size is slightly smaller
than in Table 2 (Table 2 includes missing dummies for these
students in the regression analysis). Standard deviations in
brackets. 
47Panel A: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
early Fail 0.184* 0.141** 0.135** 0.119* 0.145** 0.129** ‐0.018 ‐0.001 0.059 0.117 0.113 0.129
(0.075) (0.053) (0.051) (0.056) (0.052) (0.047) (0.069) (0.058) (0.053) (0.086) (0.079) (0.075)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age 7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.007 0.283 0.502 0.003 0.261 0.487 0.000 0.253 0.508 0.003 0.248 0.460
Observations 5117 5117 5117 5185 5185 5185 3851 3851 3851 2464 2464 2464
Number of schools 124 124 124 123 123 123 90 90 90 57 57 57
Panel B: Difference‐in‐differences
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
post x early Fail 0.111 0.131* 0.101 0.168** 0.169** 0.150** 0.010 ‐0.020 0.068 0.186* 0.158 0.146
(0.059) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.052) (0.063) (0.065) (0.060) (0.091) (0.085) (0.083)
post 0.031 0.029 0.024 ‐0.033 ‐0.011 0.022 0.091* 0.130** 0.038 ‐0.043 0.007 0.030
(0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.065) (0.056) (0.058)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age 7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.003 0.253 0.500 0.003 0.247 0.490 0.002 0.236 0.504 0.003 0.248 0.496
Observations 10532 10532 10532 10490 10490 10490 7657 7657 7657 5051 5051 5051
Number of schools 124 124 124 123 123 123 90 90 90 57 57 57
2009 Fail










(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
early Fail 0.079 0.048 0.039 0.074 0.093 0.070 ‐0.008 0.022 0.074 0.165 0.164* 0.181*
(0.071) (0.055) (0.052) (0.069) (0.056) (0.052) (0.069) (0.057) (0.060) (0.087) (0.071) (0.076)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age 7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.001 0.345 0.561 0.001 0.310 0.535 0.000 0.316 0.532 0.006 0.321 0.501
Observations 5153 5153 5153 5112 5112 5112 3795 3795 3795 2442 2442 2442
Number of schools 124 124 124 123 123 123 90 90 90 57 57 57
Panel B: Difference‐in‐differences
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
post x early Fail 0.007 0.028 ‐0.002 0.162* 0.160* 0.136* ‐0.002 ‐0.020 0.056 0.168 0.123 0.108
(0.069) (0.064) (0.063) (0.070) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.070) (0.068) (0.094) (0.089) (0.098)
post 0.140* 0.136* 0.137* 0.012 0.031 0.057 0.095* 0.131* 0.056 ‐0.047 0.019 0.039
(0.062) (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.054) (0.057) (0.046) (0.051) (0.053) (0.072) (0.062) (0.073)
Student characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age 7 test scores No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
R‐squared 0.005 0.327 0.564 0.005 0.305 0.541 0.002 0.291 0.540 0.003 0.321 0.532
Observations 10537 10537 10537 10316 10316 10316 7545 7545 7545 4988 4988 4988
Number of schools 124 124 124 123 123 123 90 90 90 57 57 57
Notes: See notes to Table A2
2009 Fail
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fail (2004 ‐ 2007) ‐0.198 ‐0.110 ‐0.045 0.099 ‐0.104 ‐0.059 0.294 0.372 ‐0.080 ‐0.036
(0.825) (1.016) (1.077) (1.473) (0.084) (0.083) (0.267) (0.319) (0.071) (0.108)
Percent free lunch 0.031 0.025 ‐0.018 0.004 ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.000 0.002 ‐0.004 0.002
(0.023) (0.049) (0.029) (0.065) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003)
0.052* 0.039 0.045 0.084 ‐0.007 ‐0.007 ‐0.007 0.009 ‐0.001 0.009
(0.026) (0.044) (0.036) (0.087) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.014) (0.004) (0.008)
Observations 834 201 823 195 671 157 658 154 642 150




Notes: Robust standard errors reported in brackets; + , * and ** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The control group for the column labelled ‘Satisfactory schools’ consists of teachers at schools attaining a
‘Satisfactory’ rating in the years 2004 – 2007; control group for the column labelled ‘Later failed schools’ consists of teachers at schools failed in the years 2009 or 2010. ‘Fail (2004‐2007)’ dummy turned on for schools failed 2004 – 2007. School‐
level controls (percent students eligible for free lunch and percent attaining English and math target) from 2004.
Appendix Table A4: Effect of a Fail Inspection on Teacher Tenure, Years of Experience and School Curriculum
Teacher tenure  (years) Teacher experience (years) Curriculum: Math (hrs/week) Curriculum: Literacy (hrs/week)
50